



*Strategic Information  
Security.*



# Attacking and Defending Web Services

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## About Security PS

Application Security Assessments

Network Security Assessments

Security Compliance Consulting

Security Training and Awareness

## ■ ■ ■ ■ Agenda

Background for Discussion

Attacks and Defenses

Information Gathering

Denial of Service


Message Confidentiality

Authentication

Access Control

Data Validation and Encoding

Conclusions



## Background for Discussion

What is a Web Service?  
Current Risk Considerations



## What is a Web Service?

Definition for Today:

Application to application communication  
over XML

Common Uses:


B2B communication

Middleware

Interface to legacy systems


AJAX ([maps.google.com](http://maps.google.com))

APIs to add functionality



## What is a Web Service?

Web Service Client



## ■ ■ ■ ■ Current Risk Considerations

### Increased popularity

The use of web services has increased dramatically in recent years

### It's still a web application

Web app security principles still apply

### Emerging technologies

Supporting standards are still being developed

“Closed door” solutions are currently common

## A Few of the Standards...

XML

XACML

ebXML

WS-Security

SOAP

REST

XSL

XAML

SAML

XKMS

WSDL

CORBA

XrML

XSD

UBR


X.509

XKMS

XLANG

UDDI






# Attacks and Defenses

Information Gathering  
Denial of Service  
Message Confidentiality  
Authentication  
Access Control  
Data Validation and Encoding

## Information Gathering (Exposure)

Visibility

Network firewalls and common ports



## Information Gathering (Exposure)

### Discovery

Google

UDDI Business Registry

Third Party Registries ([xmethods.com](http://xmethods.com))

WSDL

## Information Gathering (Exposure)

WSDL: A hacker's reference manual

<http://www.example.com/service.asmx?wsdl>

```
- <wsdl:definitions targetNamespace="http://tempuri.org/">
  - <wsdl:types>
    - <s:schema elementFormDefault="qualified" targetNamespace="http://tempuri.org/">
      - <s:element name="AddTicker">
        - <s:complexType>
          - <s:sequence>
            <s:element minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1" name="name" type="s:string"/>
            <s:element minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1" name="val" type="s:int"/>
          </s:sequence>
        </s:complexType>
      </s:element>
```

## ■ ■ ■ ■ Avoiding Information Gathering

Reduce exposure

Privately exchange WSDL

Don't assume!

## Denial of Service Attack

### DTD Interpretation

Servers can accept and interpret DTDs provided by clients

Complex/large/recursive DTD can overload parser

### Solution Options

Disable support for DTDs, use XSD instead

Ideally, don't accept any form of schema definition from the client


## Message Confidentiality

### Option 1: SSL/TLS

Common, widely supported

Fine for single hops

Point to point encryption




## Message Confidentiality

### Option 2: XML Encryption

End to end encryption

Intermediate servers are able to see the request for routing

Encrypts only a specific portion of the data





## ■ ■ ■ Authentication

### Federated Identity

Leverage existing solution

Can use SAML to communicate assertions

### Single-Use Authentication

Options available from architecture

Custom solutions

## Access Control

Forced requests for:

Services: by URL

Methods: by modifying service method

Data: by manipulating parameter values

## Results

Access to web service without authentication


Escalation of privileges

Crossed permission boundaries

## Unauthorized Access to a Web Service

Network firewalls may not help

Access control must be coded into the application or provided by the web server



## ■ ■ ■ Data Validation and Encoding

XML Data Injection

XML Parser Command Injection

SQL Injection

Cross Site Scripting


## XML Data Injection

### Example: User Account Creation

```
<UserRecord>  
  <UserID>983</UserID>  
  <Name>Dave Green</Name>  
  <Email>dgreen@securityps.com</Email>  
  <Phone>913-888-2111</Phone>  
</UserRecord>
```



Browser




## XML Data Injection Attack


```
<UserRecord>
  <UserID>859</UserID>
  <Name>Mr. Evildoer</Name>
  <Email>evil@3mu.us</Email><UserID>1</UserID><Email>evil@3mu.us</Email>
  <Phone>913-234-6789</Phone>
</UserRecord>
```




Browser



## XML Parser Command Injection




## SQL Injection






## SQL Injection Attack



## Cross Site Scripting




## Cross Site Scripting Attack

```
<UserRecord>
  <UserID>983</UserID>
  <Name>Dave Green</Name>
  <Email>" onmouseover="alert('xss');</Email>
  <Phone>913-888-2111</Phone>
</UserRecord>
```



Browser



```
Dave Green <br>
<a href="mailto:" onmouseover="alert('xss');">Email</a>
```

## ■ ■ ■ Data Validation and Encoding Solutions

### Integrity

XML Signature

Other Cryptography


### Datatyping

XML schema definitions – must be detailed

### Application Logic

Input validation: size, type, sanity

Output encoding: ensure data stays data



# Conclusions

Summary of Risks

Risk Mitigation Strategy

Security Frameworks

Web Application Security Products

Effective App Security: The SDLC

## ■ ■ ■ ■ Summary of Risks

Information Gathering

Denial of Service

Message Confidentiality

Authentication

Access Control

Data Validation and Encoding


## Summary of Risks (cont.)

No browser, but still need to defend against common web application attacks

OWASP Top 10 are still valid

Unvalidated Input	Broken Access Control
Broken Authentication and Session Management	Insecure Configuration Management
Buffer Overflows	Injection Flaws
Improper Error Handling	Insecure Storage
Denial of Service	Cross Site Scripting

## ■ Risk Mitigation Strategy





## ■ ■ ■ Security Framework Features

Many security frameworks available today provide effective high-level access to important functions such as:

User Authentication/Access Controls

Auditing

Encryption

Key Management, Certificate Management

General object permission controls

## Additional Security Layers: Products

In the wake of a large number web application security problems, many products have been introduced to help limit risk of vulnerable applications.

Automated vulnerability scanning tools

Incoming filters/proxies (App firewalls)

Outgoing filters/validators

Back-end filters/proxies

Hybrids or multi-purpose systems

## ■■■■ In Perspective

These devices:

When used correctly, can reduce specific risks.

Provide only one line of defense.

Do **not** replace the need for secure application design/development.

Should not be the only application security layer

- ■ ■ ■ Effective Application Security Efforts
  - Effectiveness: Results, Cost, Longevity/ROI
  - Consider the entire **Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC)**



## “Tactical Only” Approach

Design and develop first, secure later


General results:

Apps deployed with risk

Re-writes are costly, significant at this stage

Vulnerabilities addressed

Root cause rarely addressed



## Strategic View of Application Security


Security is a process, not a task

Early security results in less cost and strong ROI

Address the root cause, not the symptom

Address the practices first, vulnerabilities last

Incorporate proven practices into all phases of the software development lifecycle



Activities	Core	Security
Planning		
Requirements and Analysis	Functional Requirements Non Functional Requirements Technology Requirements	Security Objectives
Architecture and Design	Design Guidelines Architecture and Design Review	Security Design Guidelines Threat Modeling Security Architecture and Design Review
Development	Unit Tests Code Review Daily Builds	Security Code Review
Testing	Integration Testing System Testing	Security Testing
Deployment	Deployment Review	Security Deployment Review
Maintenance		

Microsoft's Key Security Activities Mapped to the SDLC

# Questions & Discussion